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The Case for R egulating Crypto -A ssets: A
Constitutional P erspective
Jaideep Reddy*

Abstract

In July 2019, the Ministry of Finance,
Government of India announced that an Inter-Ministerial
Committee (the ‘Committee’) had submitted its report (the
‘Committee Report’) recommending that possessing or dealing
with cryptocurrency be banned and made a criminal offence.
This article examines whether such a ban is justified under our
constitutional scheme. The article finds that the right to carry
on various kinds of crypto-asset activities can be traced to
various enumerated fundamental rights under the Constitution
of India. Analyzing the Committee Report, the article finds
that its recommendation of an outright ban is unlikely to be
a reasonable restriction on these rights, as such a ban is likely
arbitrary and excessive. Since crypto-assets are a value-neutral
platform technology - akin in many ways to the Internet - the
article recommends that an empirical approach be adopted
towards studying any risks associated with crypto-assets, and
that a regulatory approach be adopted to mitigate these risks
rather than an outright prohibition. This would comport with the
interests of liberty, innovation, and consumer protection.
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Leader, Technology Law, Nishith Desai Associates. The views expressed in this article
are personal. The author would like to acknowledge the discussions had with various
colleagues while developing the views in this article. As a note of disclosure, the author
was part of the team representing the Internet and Mobile Association of India and
another petitioner in their writ petition in the Supreme Court against the Reserve Bank
of India circular on ‘virtual currencies’. The Court in that case held that the circular
was a disproportionate restriction on fundamental rights. Since the judgment was pronounced when the article was in the final stages of editing, and since this article is primarily focused on the Inter-Ministerial Committee’s report, references to the case are
made only to the extent necessary to comment on the report.

380

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

I. Nature

of

Vol. 15

Crypto -A ssets

Traditionally, reliable transfers of value on the Internet required central intermediaries, eg, banks and clearing houses. This was in order to ensure that
bad actors did not use the same units of value more than once (a phenomenon
known as ‘double-spending’; the physical world analogy is counterfeiting).
Cryptocurrencies, or ‘crypto-assets’,1 generally aim to enable the reliable
transfer of value over the Internet without central intermediaries, while still
not allowing double-spending. 2 In other words, they seek to provide a secure
and decentralized means of transferring value online.
The first crypto-asset was Bitcoin, introduced by a seminal white paper in
2008.3 Other cryptographic systems had tried and failed to achieve a similar
end.4 For this reason, among others, the Bitcoin system has been globally
recognized as a breakthrough in computer science and cryptography. 5 The
Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology (IDRBT),
established by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has called Bitcoin a “groundbreaking application”.6

1

2

3
4

5

6

This article uses the term ‘crypto-assets’ in line with the international legal trend, because
crypto-assets have so far not shown wide adoption as a currency.
Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ <https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
ibid.
Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark, ‘Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree’ (2017) 15(4) ACM
Queue <https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3136559> accessed 4 June 2020.
ibid 15 which states that ‘Understanding all these predecessors that contain pieces of bitcoin’s design leads to an appreciation of the true genius of Nakamoto’s innovation’; See
Yossi Gilad and others, ‘Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies’
(2017) Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles 51, 51 <https://
people.csail.mit.edu/nickolai/papers/gilad-algorand-eprint.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020
which states ‘Cryptographic currencies such as Bitcoin can enable new applications, such
as smart contracts and fair protocols, can simplify currency conversions, and can avoid
trusted centralized authorities that regulate transactions’; Luke W. Vrotsos and Cindy
H. Zhang, ‘Harvard Invests Millions in New Cryptocurrency’ The Harvard Crimson (12
April 2019) <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/4/12/hmc-crypto-investment/>
accessed 4 June 2020; Digital Currency Initiative <https://dci.mit.edu/> accessed 4 June
2020.
Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology, Applications of Blockchain
Technology to Banking and Financial Sectors in India (IDRBT, White Paper, 2017) chs
1, 3 <https://www.idrbt.ac.in/assets/publications/Best%20Practices/BCT.pdf> accessed 4
June 2020.
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Value-Neutral , P latform

Technology
Bitcoin was introduced to reduce transactions costs of financial intermediaries and mitigate a certain type of credit card fraud known as chargeback
fraud.7 Its benign goal was to increase efficiencies in e-commerce transactions.8 It also appears to have sought to preserve privacy to the extent that
stock exchanges and banks already did.9 This is not to run away from the
fact that crypto-assets have also proven to be a vehicle for crime in many
cases, and present new challenges to law enforcement.10 Rather, it is meant
to show that the system is not designed with any negative values embedded, but rather was intended to create a new technology to facilitate existing
commerce.
For reasons beyond the scope of this article (but most notably, price volatility), crypto-assets like Bitcoin have not made a compelling case to be
used as a means to purchase and sell everyday goods and services. However,
crypto-assets still present some tangible benefits, some of which have materialized and some of which are emerging. Some examples are discussed below:
• Software applications: Most notably, after the creation of Bitcoin,
crypto-asset networks like Ethereum emerged, which allow computer
programmers to run their software applications on a decentralised
network, as opposed to a central server or a set of servers.11 This
aims to decentralise the risk associated with running a software
application on a single server maintained by a single entity, in case
that server suffers from downtime or is compromised, or the entity is
7
8
9

10

11

Nakamoto (n 2).
Nakamoto (n 2).
Nakamoto (n 2) states, ‘The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. ... The public
can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information
linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by
stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the “tape”, is made public,
but without telling who the parties were.’ One notes that stock exchanges and banks are
generally regulated by Know Your Customer (KYC) obligations. However, this is a matter
of regulation and not the design of the system. As discussed subsequently, jurisdictions like
the E.U. and Canada have begun to impose KYC obligations on crypto-asset intermediaries. Further, there is still generally no KYC system globally for physical cash.
Eg, Water Pavlo, ‘Crime and Punishment in the Cryptocurrency World’ <https://www.
forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2020/02/25/crime-and-punishment-in-the-cryptocurrency-world/#5ac7ede748fe> accessed 4 June 2020.
A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform (An introductory paper to Ethereum, introduced before launch, which is maintained) (White Paper,
Ethereum Foundation, 2013-19) <https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper>
accessed 4 June 2020.
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untrustworthy. Programmers run their software applications on the
network by paying fees to the network in crypto-assets (in Ethereum,
the crypto-asset is known as ‘Ether’).12 The network in turn allocates
these fees to the participants per a pre-determined logic. Instead of
fees accumulating to a single entity, fees are distributed to a greater
network of participants, in small chunks. This system of compensation may not be feasible through the traditional financial system
due to the number of participants, the small size of transactions,
and the automated exchange of value through ‘smart contracts’. As
institutional endorsement of this technology, over 500 firms globally (including Accenture, AMD, BBVA, BP, Credit Suisse, Deloitte,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, HP, Infosys, ING, Intel, JP Morgan,
Microsoft, Pfizer, Thomson Reuters, Samsung, and Santander) chose
to form the ‘Enterprise Ethereum Alliance’, a non-profit corporation,
to collaborate to develop enterprise blockchain solutions based on the
Ethereum network (there are other platforms like Ethereum such as
EOS and Stellar, and each – being at a relatively early stage – is finding its feet technologically). With these innovations, the wider software development community in India and abroad is now looking to
acquire skills in developing decentralized software applications using
crypto-assets.13
• Remittance: India was found by the World Bank to be the largest
receiver of inward migrant remittances globally in 2018, receiving
USD 79 billion.14 The same report of the World Bank also noted that
the average cost of receiving remittances in South Asia was 5.2% in
the first quarter of 2018, which would translate to a cost of approximately USD 4.1 billion, or approximately INR 28,914 crore, annually
for India. By contrast, some crypto-asset networks promise cost-savings of up to 60% on cross-border remittances.15 This would translate to cost-savings of approximately INR 17,348 crore a year for the
12
13

14

15

ibid.
Eg, Khwaja Shaik, ‘The Top 10 Blockchain Skills you Need to Develop’ (IBM, 1 March
2018)
<https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/03/the-top-10-blockchain-skillsyou-need-to-develop/> accessed 4 June 2020.
World Bank Group and Knomad, Migration and Remittances, Recent Developments
and Outlook (Migration and Development Brief, April 2019) <https://www.knomad.
org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Migrationanddevelopmentbrief31.pdf> accessed 4 June
2020; World Bank Group, Record High Remittances Sent Globally in 2018 (Washington,
Press Release No. 2019/1488, April 2019) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018> accessed 4 June 2020.
Monica Long, ‘Ripple and XRP Can Cut Banks’ Global Settlement Costs Up to 60 Percent’
(Ripple: Insights, 23 February 2016) <https://ripple.com/insights/ripple-and-xrp-can-cutbanks-global-settlement-costs-up-to-60-percent/> accessed 4 June 2020.
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country; for perspective, this amounts to the expenditure of India’s
nationwide Mid Day Meals scheme for close to 2 years.16
• Store of value: Individuals today choose a variety of investment avenues including bank deposits, company shares, real estate, foreign
currency, and commodities. Crypto-assets present an additional
investment avenue for those who see promise in the future of the technology, based on the above or other use-cases.
The above illustrations are not intended to comment on whether crypto-assets and blockchain technology will ultimately prove to be effective or
successful. Of that, time may be the best judge, and the technology is still
finding its feet. However, the above illustrations are meant to show that
crypto-assets are not inherently good or bad, but are a platform technology
holding significant promise. They can only be normatively or legally assessed
based on the use to which they are put. In that aspect, they can be likened to
platform technologies of yore, each of which did not emerge without societal
fears of severe harm: electricity, railways, telecommunications, motor vehicles, aircrafts, mobile phones, and the Internet.17 In fact, in its early years,
even the company business structure was criticized by well-known thinkers of the time.18 These technologies and innovations are different in nature
to phenomena which are considered by Indian law to be inherently pernicious, such as gambling, immoral trafficking, alcohol, or narcotic substances
(activities known as res extra commercium).19 Crypto-asset systems should
hence be treated by the law on the same plane as platform technologies like
the Internet (which are regulated), rather than as vices or socially harmful
activities (which are banned outright).

16

17

18

19

Ministry of Finance-Government of India, Expenditure Profile 2017-2018 (2018) 25
<https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/ub2017-18/eb/stat4a.pdf> accessed 4
June 2020.
Nishith Desai and others, Building a Successful Blockchain Ecosystem for India: Regulatory
Approaches to Crypto-Assets (Research Paper, December 2018) 2 <http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research_Papers/Building-a-Successful-BlockchainEcosystem-for-India.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020; See Nathaniel Whittemore, ‘PODCAST:
Josh Brown on Why Bitcoin is like the 1800s Railroad Boom’ (Coindesk: Bitcoin Macro, 8
November 2019) <https://www.coindesk.com/podcast-josh-brown-on-why-bitcoin-is-likethe-1800s-railroad-boom> accessed 4 June 2020.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of the Nations (Book V, 1776) 374 <http://media.
bloomsbury.com/rep/files/primary-source-93-adam-smith-the-wealth-of-nations-on-jointstock-companies.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574, para 60 (Khoday case).
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III. Constitutional Freedoms A ssociated
Crypto -A ssets

with

In our constitutional scheme, it is well-settled that fundamental rights
are to be construed liberally with rights-holders being at center stage and
the State being highly accountable.20 Ten Judges of the Supreme Court of
India in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India21 (known as the Bank
Nationalisation case) held:
Impairment of the right of the individual and not the object of the
State in taking the impugned action, is the measure of protection. To
concentrate merely on power of the State and the object of the State
action in exercising that power is therefore to ignore the true intent
of the Constitution. ... Protection of the right to property or personal
freedom is most needed when there is an actual threat. To argue that
State action which deprives a person permanently or temporarily of
his right to property, or personal freedom, operates to extinguish the
right or the remedy is to reduce the guarantee to an empty platitude.
Again to hold that the extent of, and the circumstances in which, the
guarantee of protection is available depends upon the object of the
State action, is to seriously erode its effectiveness. (emphasis added)

With that in mind, various constitutional and fundamental rights dealing
with crypto-assets are discussed below. It goes without saying that these
rights are subject to reasonable restrictions contemplated by the Constitution.
1. The right to trade and do business under Articles 19(1)(g) and 301:
Persons carrying out commercial activities such as mining crypto-assets, buying and selling crypto-assets, or bartering crypto-assets would
be doing so in exercise of their fundamental right under Article 19(1)
(g) and constitutional right under Article 301. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the aforesaid Articles to include the right to carry
on any trade which is not res extra commercium i.e., (“inherently
vicious and pernicious, and is condemned by all civilised societies”,
“immoral and criminal”, and “articles or goods which are obnoxious
and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the general public”). 22
Prominent examples of activities held to be res extra commercium
in India are alcohol, gambling, and human trafficking. 23 For reasons
20
21
22
23

Eg, PUCL v Union of India, (2005) 2 SCC 436.
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248.
Khoday case.
Khoday case; State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699 : 1957 SCR
874; Cooverjee B. Bharucha v Excise Commr., Ajmer AIR 1954 SC 220 : 1954 SCR 873.
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stated above, crypto-assets are a platform technology with benefits
and risks, and dealing with them does not have an immoral or inherently pernicious element. Countries around the world, including the
Indian government in various reports as described in this article, have
recognized its benefits (while also acknowledging risks). As discussed
subsequently, no developed and democratic country has chosen to
prohibit crypto-asset activity.
		 The Supreme Court in Internet and Mobile Assn. of India v. RBI (the
‘IAMAI’ case) has recognized that all those who carry out crypto-asset business activity (other than those who do so as a hobby without
any expectation of profit) are entitled to the right under Article 19(1)
(g) in respect of such activity. 24
2. The right to life, liberty and privacy under Article 21: In K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India (the now famous ‘Right to Privacy’
case) decided by a Nine Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, various
opinions of the learned Judges referred to the autonomy and dignity
of the individual as being fundamental to the freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution. 25 The learned Judges upheld the right of individuals to make decisions autonomously as a fundamental right. For
instance, Chandrachud, J. (for four learned Judges) held:
		 “Life is precious in itself. But life is worth living because of the freedoms which enable each individual to live life as it should be lived.
The best decisions on how life should be lived are entrusted to the
individual. They are continuously shaped by the social milieu in which
individuals exist. The duty of the state is to safeguard the ability to
take decisions – the autonomy of the individual – and not to dictate
those decisions.” (emphasis added)
		 Similarly, Nariman, J. held that the fundamental right of privacy
would include the “privacy of choice, which protects an individual’s autonomy over fundamental personal choices. … The dignity
of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop
to the full extent of his potential. And this development can only be
if an individual has autonomy over fundamental personal choices.”
(emphasis added)

24
25

Internet and Mobile Assn. of India v RBI, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 275.
K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. (Right to Privacy case)
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		Observations to a similar effect were made by all the remaining
learned Judges who authored opinions viz. Chelameswar, Bobde,
Sapre, and Kaul, JJ.
		 The decision of an individual to participate in a technological and
mathematical breakthrough acknowledged by leading institutions
worldwide, like crypto-assets, is a fundamental personal choice.
Individuals exercise their fundamental personal choice to participate
in crypto-assets, whether by writing software programs which use
crypto-assets, buying and selling crypto-assets based on the promise of the underlying technology, or ‘mining’ crypto-assets which
contributes to the maintenance of the global network. They do so
in exercise of their autonomy to take decisions regarding their own
lives. Therefore, it is submitted that the right to participate in a legitimate technological innovation such as crypto-assets would be a part
of individuals’ right to liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
3. The right to property under Article 300A: In K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd.
v. State of Karnataka, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
held that the term ‘property’ under Article 300A includes intangibles
like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every
possible interest recognised by law.26 Similarly, according to Black’s
Law Dictionary, ‘property’ includes the rights in an intangible, and
the said dictionary states that these rights include the right to possess
and use, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer. 27 It alternatively defines property as “any external thing over which the rights of
possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised”. 28
		 A crypto-asset is a unit on an Internet-based ledger which can be
transacted using a unique ‘private key’, which is a cryptographic series
of characters. Only those who know the private key possess and may
transfer the crypto-asset. Crypto-assets are generated or ‘mined’ by
the exertion of computer power to solve non-obvious cryptographic
problems, and are thereafter transacted on the basis of the value
ascribed by market forces. The holder of the private key excludes
26
27

28

K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (K.T. Plantation case).
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed 2019) states that ‘property (14c) 1. Collectively, the
rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible. It is common to describe
property as a “bundle of rights.” These rights include the right to possess and use, the right
to exclude, and the right to transfer. — Also termed bundle of rights. 2. Any external thing
over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised <the airport is city
property>’.
ibid.
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others from possession and the ability to transfer. Since crypto-assets
can be possessed, used, and transferred, and their holder can exclude
others from doing these actions, it is submitted that they have the
legal characteristics of ‘property’. 29
		 Since the K.T. Plantation case expressly recognizes intangibles, it is
difficult to argue that crypto-assets, as a representation of value on
the Internet, are not ‘property’ under Article 300A merely because
they are intangible. Importantly, in the IAMAI case, the Court recognized that virtual currencies / crypto-assets are a form of ‘intangible
property’.30 Its finding that virtual currencies can act under certain
circumstances as money does not hamper the argument that crypto-assets are ‘property’ under Article 300A, since money has been
treated as a form of property under the Constitution and under Indian
statutes.31
		 Holders of crypto-assets should hence not be deprived of their crypto-assets except in accordance with the principles laid down under
Article 300A, i.e., for a public purpose and with payment of compensation in a just, fair, and reasonable manner.32
4. Right to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a): While
the argument is novel and untested globally, it is worth considering
whether crypto-asset activity may be protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. It is well settled that the freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the freedom of propagation

29

30
31

32

Under the General Clauses Act 1897, s 2(36) ‘movable property’ means ‘property of every
description, except immovable property’. See also infra n. 31. Crypto-assets would hence
be movable property and holders of them would have the rights of holders of any other
movable property, such as civil and criminal remedies against theft.
IAMAI case, para 6.87.
Eg, Dwarkadas Shrinivas v Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 : 1954
SCR 674 para 33 in which while holding a measure to infringe the right to property under
(then) Article 31 of the Constitution, Mahajan, J observed, ‘[t]he plaintiff and the other
preference shareholders therefore are in imminent danger of losing the shares themselves
or losing valuable property in the nature of money which they will have to pay out in order
to meet the call.’ (emphasis added); Sale of Goods Act 1930, s 2(7) provides that ‘goods’
means ‘every kind of moveable property other than actionable claims and money’, thereby
demonstrating that the term ‘moveable property’ includes ‘money’. In addition, as mentioned above, a Constitution Bench in the KT Plantation case held that ‘property’ under
art 300A embraces ‘every possible interest recognized by law.’ Further, the Court in the
IAMAI case recognized that virtual currencies can have characteristics of both goods and
money, holding at para 6.86, “[t]herefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the
petitioners that VCs are just goods/commodities and can never be regarded as real money”
(emphasis added).
K.T. Plantation case.

388

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 15

of ideas.33 This freedom has been held to extend to the Internet medium
which provides a market place of ideas to persons of all kinds.34 To the
author’s knowledge, no Indian court has considered the application of
Article 19(1)(a) to computer software programmes or cryptography.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) has held, in the
context of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (providing
the right to free speech), that encryption software, in its source code
form and as employed by those in the field of cryptography, was protected by the First Amendment.35 It was held that cryptographers use
source code to express their scientific ideas in much the same way that
mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs. Separately,
the U.S. Supreme Court has also held certain types of election-related
corporate expenditure to be protected by the First Amendment, hence
showing that free speech can extend to economic elements of expression.36 In the context of crypto-assets, possibilities of expressive activity include: writing and publishing of the underlying software code;
running the code on a computer system; writing, publishing, and
running software code for decentralised applications such as ‘smart
contracts’; expressing the value of things in terms of crypto-assets;
and using crypto-assets in contexts intended to be expressive of ideas,
such as decentralisation.37 Due to the lack of judicial precedents on
33
34
35

36

37

Romesh Thappar v State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : 1950 SCR 594.
Shreya Singhal v Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
Daniel J Bernstein v US Department of Justice (9th Cir) No. 97-16686 (May 6, 1999)
(“encryption software, in its source code form and as employed by those in the field of cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment purposes… Cryptographers
use source code to express their scientific ideas in much the same way that mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs. Of course, both mathematical equations
and graphs are used in other fields for many purposes, not all of which are expressive.
But mathematicians and economists have adopted these modes of expression in order to
facilitate the precise and rigorous expression of complex scientific ideas. Similarly, the
undisputed record here makes it clear that cryptographers utilize source code in the same
fashion”).
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 2010 SCC OnLine US SC 10 : 558 US 310
(2010).
Crypto-assets operate only by way of cryptography-based software programmes, written by
software programmers in the field of crypto-assets and blockchain technology. Underlying
each such software programme is the source code. Further, every crypto-asset transaction
is nothing more than a software message propagated to the participants of the network.
Every software programmer creating a crypto-asset network and every participant transacting in crypto-assets can therefore be said to be expressing, through source code or software messages, their participation in the new technological innovation. In addition, many
blockchain software programs, such as those written on the popular Ethereum network,
use a crypto-asset (in Ethereum, ‘Ether’) as the ‘fuel’ to enable the operation of the software
program. They cannot execute their software programs on these networks without using
crypto-assets like Ether. Further, crypto-asset technology has created a new form of transactions which can be enabled over the Internet. Such transactions earlier were not possible

2019

THE CASE FOR REGULATING CRYPTO-ASSETS

389

the subject in India, whether Indian courts will recognize crypto-asset activity to be protected by Article 19(1)(a) is uncertain and may
depend on the context of the activity over which the right is being
asserted. 38 Broadly speaking, any expressive activity which is directly
affected39 by a prohibition on crypto-asset activity may be held to
be covered by Article 19(1)(a). Importantly, if a right under Article
19(1)(a) is recognized in the context of crypto-asset activity, the main
consequence is that any restriction on the same must necessarily be
traced to the itemised grounds under Article 19(2), rather than the
more sweeping ground for a restriction under Article 19(6) (“in the
interests of the general public”) vis-à-vis Article 19(1)(g).
5. Rights under Article 14: All persons in India have the right under
Article 14 to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory State action. As
far as arbitrariness is concerned, a legislation would be invalidated
under Article 14 when it is done capriciously, irrationally, without
adequate determining principle, and/or is excessive and disproportionate.40 It must be supported by a relevant consideration of material
facts.41 As far as non-discrimination is concerned, Article 14 essentially requires that among equals the law should be equal and equally
administered, and that likes should be treated alike.42 Any distinction
made by the law between persons (i.e., any classification of persons)
must be based on intelligible differentia, and the intelligible differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the Act.43
		These principles are applicable to legislative actions and not just
administrative actions.44 For instance, the Supreme Court in the 2013
case of State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn.
struck down a Maharashtra Act prohibiting dance performances in
eating houses and bars as there was little or no material on the basis
of which the State concluded that dancing in the prohibited establishments was likely to deprave, corrupt, or injure public morals.45

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

without central intermediaries. By participating in the technology, individuals may express
their endorsement and belief in the new ideas introduced by this technology.
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
Bennett Coleman and Co. v Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.
Shayara Bano v Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 (Sitaram case).
K.R. Lakshman v Karnataka Electricity Board, (2001) 1 SCC 442.
Special Courts Bill, 1978 , In re, (1979) 1 SCC 380.
Sitaram case.
State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel and Restaurants Assn., (2013) 8 SCC 519 as discussed by Indian Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v State of Maharashtra, (2019) 3 SCC 429.
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The Court also held that it was not a permissible classification to
distinguish between exempted establishments (gymkhanas and 3-star
or higher hotels) and prohibited establishments (all other establishments) as the class of a person could not speak for a person’s morality
or decency. This case was specifically applied in the IAMAI case in
the context of the RBI circular on virtual currencies. Persons carrying
out crypto-asset activity therefore would have the fundamental right
to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions by the State on
this activity.

IV. R easonable R estrictions
The above rights are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restrictions
in accordance with the Constitution. These restrictions are of slightly varying nature depending on the corresponding right. The rights under Article
19 are subject to “reasonable restrictions”,46 the right under Article 21 can
only be taken away by “fair, just and reasonable” procedure established
by law,47 the right under Article 14 can only be taken away on the basis of
a reasonable classification as described above, and the right under Article
300A can only be taken away if the State action was for a public purpose and
with compensation to the affected persons.48
Broadly speaking, fundamental rights can only be impinged upon if the
measure is not arbitrary or disproportionate.49 While non-arbitrariness is a
multi-faceted concept, its elements which are relevant to this article are (as
held by several cases): (i) a measure is taken with due application of mind and
consideration of relevant facts, 50 and (ii) a measure is founded on intelligible
differentia (i.e., does not treat equals unequally) which have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved.51
The test of proportionality requires that: (i) the restrictive measure is designated for a proper purpose; (ii) the measure is rationally connected to the
fulfilment of the purpose; (iii) there are no alternative less invasive measures;
and (iv) there is a proper relation between the importance of achieving the
aim and the importance of limiting the right.52
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51
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Papnasam Labour Union v Madura Coats Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 501.
Right to Privacy case.
K.T. Plantation case.
K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1. (Aadhaar case)
Sitaram case.
Special Courts Bill, 1978 ,In re, (1979) 1 SCC 380.
Aadhaar case.
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Two recent examples of cases where the Supreme Court has held State
action to be arbitrary and disproportionate are K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union
of India.53 (the ‘Aadhaar’ case) and the Indian Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v.
State of Maharashtra (the ‘dance performances’ case).54 In the Aadhaar case,
decided by a Constitution Bench, the majority struck down subordinate legislations requiring Indian residents to compulsorily link their mobile numbers and bank accounts with their Aadhaar numbers, finding the linkage
requirements to be disproportionate. It found that, in the context of bank
account-Aadhaar linkage, though the State claimed that such linkage was
in order to tackle money laundering, the State had not explained how such
linkage would in fact reduce money laundering. It also found that the State
had not discharged its burden of why Aadhaar linking was imperative when
banks were already carrying out alternative Know Your Customer (KYC)
methods. It held that the presumption of criminality is treated as disproportionate, and that “[u]nder the garb of prevention of money laundering
or black money, there cannot be such a sweeping provision which targets
every resident of the country as a suspicious person.” It found that the State
should have carried out a proper study about the methods adopted by persons who indulge in money laundering and the kinds of bank accounts which
such persons maintain, and targeted those bank accounts for the purpose of
Aadhaar linking. Similarly, it held that the circular requiring persons to link
their mobile numbers with Aadhaar was “disproportionate and unreasonable State compulsion”. It held that there could be less intrusive alternatives
to this mandatory linkage, and that “for the misuse of such SIM cards by a
handful of persons, the entire population cannot be subjected to intrusion
into their private lives.”
In the dance performances case, the Court struck down various provisions of a Maharashtra Act restricting dance performances in certain kinds
of commercial establishments. An example of a provision it found arbitrary
and disproportionate was a provision proscribing the serving of alcohol in
rooms where dance was performed. It found that the State was influenced by
moralistic overtones, and that even if there are isolated incidents of misbehaviour with dancers, alternative measures – and not a complete prohibition
– would have to be adopted.
However, the locus classicus on the reasonableness of a restriction on
fundamental rights is (arguably) the early case of Chintaman Rao v. State
of M.P., decided by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 1950.55
53
54
55

Aadhaar case.
Indian Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v State of Maharashtra, (2019) 3 SCC 429.
Chintaman Rao v State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118 : 1950 SCR 759.

392

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 15

In Chintaman Rao, the Court struck down a restriction on the manufacture
of bidis during the agricultural season, holding that alternative, less invasive
measures were available (such as a regulation of the hours of work) and that
the impugned measure went much in excess of its object (adequate supply
of agricultural labour in bidi manufacturing areas). It also found that the
effect of the measure was that a manufacturer of bidis could not employ
persons even from places not covered by the notification. It held that such a
prohibition was of an arbitrary nature as it had no relation to the object of
the legislation.
The right to property under Article 300A too, though not a fundamental right, cannot be restricted in a disproportionate or excessive manner.
This has been held by a Constitution Bench in the K.T. Plantation case.56
The Court held that before depriving persons of their right under Article
300A, there has to be a ‘public purpose’ and the right to claim compensation.
The Court held further that the measure (including the compensation) must
always be “just, fair and reasonable” as understood in terms of Articles 14,
19(1)(g), and other Articles.
This article analyzes whether these criteria of reasonableness and proportionality are met by the Committee’s recommendation of an outright ban on
crypto-asset activity.

V. A nalyzing E ach R eason

in the

Committee R eport

The Committee Report was completed in February 2019 and released publicly in July 2019.57 The Committee consisted of the following members:
a) Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance,
who was the Chairman;
b) Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
(MeitY);
c) Chairman, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI); and
56
57

K.T. Plantation case.
Department of Economic Affairs, Report of the Committee to Propose Specific Actions
to be Taken in Relation to Virtual Currencies (Ministry of Finance-Government of India,
28 February 2019) <https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Approved%20and%20Signed%20
Report%20and%20Bill%20of%20IMC%20on%20VCs%2028%20Feb%202019.pdf>
accessed 4 June 2020; Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Inter-Ministerial
Committee on Virtual Currencies submits its Report along with Draft Bill ‘Banning of
Cryptocurrency & Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019’ (Press Release, 22
July 2019) <https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1579759> accessed 4 June
2020.
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d) Deputy Governor, RBI.
The minutes of the Committee’s meetings suggest that it also closely consulted the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes.58
The Committee Report recommends the introduction of a Draft Banning
of Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019
(the ‘Draft Bill’) which provides for an outright ban on the use of ‘cryptocurrency’ (as defined in the Draft Bill) for any purpose, including buying,
selling, and storing. The Draft Bill in fact criminalizes activities relating to
‘cryptocurrency’ with a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years.
In light of the constitutional principles discussed above, this is on its face
an extreme step since it criminalizes all uses of a value-neutral technology.
As stated above, crypto-assets are a platform technology which can be used
for beneficial or harmful purposes, like the Internet. The Draft Bill would
prevent all useful applications of the technology which, as described above,
include applications which can bring significant cost-savings in cross-border inward migrant remittances, and innovations in decentralized software
applications by India’s software community. Importantly, it would, in one
fell swoop, bring 50 lakh persons in India under the threat of criminal prosecution, facing a potential ten-year jail term, forcing them to dispose of a
legitimate and valuable asset. Because of these severe repercussions, the
Draft Bill needs close scrutiny on whether it is a reasonable restriction on the
fundamental freedoms discussed above with respect to crypto-assets.
Below, each reason given by the Committee Report in support of the
Draft Bill is set out along with responses setting out why – it is submitted –
the reason is specious and/or can be effectively addressed with a less invasive
measure.
Committee Report’s Reason: Crypto-assets do not have any of the benefits of fiat currency and cannot replace fiat currency.59
Response: The mere fact that the technology has a value-transfer or value-storage role does not mean that it has to be fiat currency or legal tender.
There are many systems of value transfer or stores of value which work in
tandem with fiat currency, including gold and loyalty points systems. In fact,
the largest multi-brand loyalty points system in India consists of over 100

58
59

Committee Report (n 57) 84-85.
Committee Report (n 57) 27.

394

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 15

million customers and over 100 leading, mainstream commercial enterprises.60 Customers earn ‘points’ by making purchases and the points can in
turn be redeemed for value at a large network of merchants.61 These points
are not legal tender or fiat currency in India and are purely contractual.
Similarly, gold, which is used as a store of value and investment asset by
many persons (including the RBI) is not legal tender or fiat currency in India.
Therefore, the use of crypto-assets cannot be prohibited merely because it
is not fiat currency or does not have its characteristics. Rather, an empirical
economic assessment of the financial stability or monetary policy implications of the use of crypto-assets should be carried out, and its usage regulated
accordingly. No such empirical assessment appears to have been carried out
by the Committee or any other authority in India.
Committee Report’s Reason: Crypto-assets have no inherent value beyond
the utility their underlying technologies represent.62
Response: In economic theory, value is widely acknowledged to be determined by individuals’ subjective preferences, which dictate demand and supply for a particular item.63 This is clearly borne out by the high values often
paid for antiques, artwork, and other collectors’ items, which go far beyond
the cost of labour and materials associated with such items. For instance,
a gold coin – one of the last gold coins to be minted in the United States –
was sold for 7.6 million USD in 2002.64 The most valuable work of art ever
sold at an auction was Pablo Picasso’s 1955 painting, Les femmes d’Alger,
which was sold for 179.3 million USD in 2015.65 It is difficult to say that the
Committee Report would have ascribed such a high ‘inherent value’ to these
items. Yet, it could be nobody’s case that transactions in collectors’ items
should be banned. It would be difficult to justify a restriction on a constitutional freedom merely because the State is of the view that the activity lacks
60

61
62
63

64

65

See Payback <https://payback.in.> accessed 4 June 2020; also InterMiles <intermiles.com>
accessed 4 June 2020.
ibid.
Committee Report (n 57) 27.
Edward P. Stringham, ‘Economic Value and Costs are Subjective’ in Peter J. Boettke (ed),
Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) ch 4
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1676261> accessed 4 June 2020 states, ‘With a few exceptions,
almost all modern economists believe that goods are valued based on how they satisfy
individuals’ subjective preferences.’
‘The Most Expensive Items Ever Auctioned: Double Eagle Coin’ (CNN Business, 2
March 2016) <https://money.cnn.com/gallery/luxury/2016/03/02/most-expensive-auction-items/7.html> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘The Most Expensive Items Ever Auctioned: Pablo Picasso’s Les Femmes d’Alger’ (CNN
Business, 2 March 2016) <https://money.cnn.com/gallery/luxury/2016/03/02/most-expensive-auction-items/index.html> accessed 4 June 2020.

2019

THE CASE FOR REGULATING CRYPTO-ASSETS

395

value. As Chandrachud, J. observed in the Right to Privacy case, “[t]he duty
of the state is to safeguard the ability to take decisions – the autonomy of the
individual – and not to dictate those decisions.”
In any case, crypto-assets are founded on the scientific breakthrough
made in Satoshi Nakamoto’s 2008 paper,66 a breakthrough that has been
acknowledged by computer scientists worldwide67 as well as by the RBI
and other Indian government authorities in various reports. In short, crypto-assets enable the transfer of value over the Internet without central intermediaries, something that was not achieved prior to 2008 despite various
attempts. In fact, even the Committee Report states that crypto-assets do
not have inherent value “beyond the utility their underlying technologies
represent”, thereby in fact recognizing that there is value in crypto-assets
due to the utility of the technology.
Further, the market forces ascribing value to crypto-assets make it clear
that such value is not a result of the irrational exuberance of a few participants. The total market capitalization of crypto-assets listed on coinmarketcap.com (considered one of the leading market data websites in
the crypto-asset industry) as of May 2020 was approximately 261 billion
USD.68 In addition, crypto-assets have received investment and recognition
from reputed institutions and individuals including Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Harvard University, JP Morgan, Fidelity, Samsung, Visa,
Mastercard, Microsoft, Ratan Tata, Khosla Ventures, and many others.69
66
67

68
69

Nakamoto (n 2).
For example, Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark (n 4) 15 states, ‘Understanding all these
predecessors that contain pieces of bitcoin’s design leads to an appreciation of the true
genius of Nakamoto’s innovation’; Yossi Gilad (n 5) states, ‘Cryptographic currencies such
as Bitcoin can enable new applications, such as smart contracts and fair protocols, can
simplify currency conversions, and can avoid trusted centralized authorities that regulate
transactions.’
Based on data from coinmarketcap.com as of May 2020.
MIT Digital Currency Initiative <https://dci.mit.edu/> accessed 4 June 2020; Luke W.
Vrotsos and Cindy H. Zhang, ‘Harvard Invests Millions in New Cryptocurrency’ (The
Harvard Crimson, 12 April 2019) <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/4/12/
hmc-crypto-investment/> accessed 4 June 2020; ‘J.P. Morgan creates Digital Coin for
Payments’ (J.P. Morgan, 14 February 2019) <https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/
digital-coin-payments> accessed 4 June 2020; Colin Harper, ‘J.P. Morgan Opens Accounts
for Bitcoin Exchanges- Coinbase and Gemini Up First’ (Forbes, 12 May 2020) <https://
www.forbes.com/sites/colinharper/2020/05/12/jp-morgan-opens-accounts-for-bitcoinexchanges--coinbase-and-gemini-up-first/> accessed 4 June 2020; Fidelity Digital Assets
<www.fidelitydigitalassets.com> accessed 4 June 2020; Billy Bambrough, ‘Samsung is
Quietly Becoming A Major Bitcoin, Crypto and Blockchain Player’ (Forbes, 18 February
2020)
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/02/18/samsung-is-quietly-becoming-a-major-bitcoin-crypto-and-blockchain-player/> accessed 4 June 2020;
Michael del Castillo, ‘Visa Grants Coinbase Power to Issue Bitcoin Debit Cards’ (Forbes,
19 February
2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2020/02/19/
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This indicates a degree of sophistication in the crypto-asset market which
cannot be written off with a cursory remark.
Committee Report’s Reason: Crypto-assets are volatile and the subject of
speculation and price manipulation.70
Response: Recent events in the stock and commodities markets have shown
that volatility is a characteristic not unique to crypto-assets. For instance, in
October 2019, the shares of a large telecom company fell by 35% in two days
and by over 80% since the start of the year.71 The crises affecting banks and
non-banking financial institutions also took their toll. In February 2018, in
just two days, approximately 5 lakh crore Indian Rupees of value was erased
from stocks listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).72 In September
2018, the market capitalization of BSE-listed stocks fell by 8.47 lakh crore
Indian Rupees in five days.73 The price of certain stocks fell by up to 60%
within a single day.74
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visa-grants-coinbase-power-to-issue-bitcoin-debit-cards/#34061f3b2e83> accessed 4
June 2020; Kevin Helms, ‘Visa Files Patent for Cryptocurrency System to Replace Cash’
(Bitcoin.com, 15 May 2020) <https://news.bitcoin.com/visa-cryptocurrency-system/>
accessed 4 June 2020; Avi, ‘Mastercard Patents a Method to Manage Cryptocurrency
“Fractional Reserves”’ (Bitcoin.com, 18 July 2018) <https://news.bitcoin.com/mastercard-patents-a-method-to-manage-cryptocurrency-fractional-reserves/> accessed 4
June 2020; ‘Ethereum Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Full Guide’ (Microsoft) <https://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/p/ethereum-cryptocurrency-and-blockchain-full-guide/9n0mjg5x40n8> accessed 4 June 2020; ‘Ratan Tata, American Express invest in digital currency startup Abra’ (The Economic Times, 24 October 2015) <https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/ratan-tata-american-express-invest-in-digital-currency-startup-abra/articleshow/49496937.cms> accessed 4 June 2020; Jeff Kauflin, ‘Startup
Raises $23 Million to Make Crypto Trades Faster and Stealthier’ (Forbes, 16 August 2018)
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2018/08/16/startup-raises-23-million-to-makecrypto-trades-faster-and-stealthier/> accessed 4 June 2020.
Committee Report (n 57) 29.
‘Vodafone Idea Share hits Fresh All-time Low on SC Verdict, Nosedives 35% in Two
Days’, (Business Today, 25 October 2019) <https://www.businesstoday.in/markets/company-stock/vodafone-idea-share-hits-fresh-all-time-low-on-sc-verdict-nosedives-35-intwo-days/story/386718.html> accessed 4 June 2020.
Sriram Iyer, ‘Indian Markets Have Just Lost Over $75 Billion—But it’s Not all Jaitley’s
Fault’ (Quartz India, 6 February 2018) <https://qz.com/india/1199373/bse-blowout-indian-markets-have-lost-over-75-billion-but-its-not-all-arun-jaitleys-fault/> accessed 4 June
2020.
‘Investors Poorer by Rs 8.5 lakh Crore as Market Turmoil Continues for Fifth Day’ (Times
of India, 24 September 2018) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/investors-poorer-by-rs-8-5-lakh-crore-as-market-turmoil-continues-for-fifth-day/
articleshow/65935108.cms> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘On Edge: On the Volatility in Indian Markets’ (The Hindu, 24 September 2018) <https://
www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/on-edge/article25022243.ece> accessed 4 June
2020.
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In October 2019, shares of certain mid-sized banks fell by over 21% in
intraday trade, and the shares of one of these banks – Yes Bank – shot back
up by 33% two days later.75 At its low in October 2019, shares of this bank –
which was once the country’s sixth largest private sector lender – had fallen
so as to erode 92% of investors’ wealth from its record high just 14 months
earlier.76 Later, in the same month, the price rose by 39% in intraday trading
and by 60% in one month.77
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in 52 lakh crore Indian
rupees of investor losses on the Indian equity market, erasing nearly six years
of gains in one fell swoop.78
To compare, the annualized volatility of Bitcoin was 166.45% as of
March 27, 2020,79 while the annualized volatility of Yes Bank and Zee
Entertainment Enterprises Limited derivatives as of March 28, 2020 was
428.5% and 170.65% respectively.80
Yet it cannot be the Committee Report’s case that securities trading ought
to be prohibited because of high volatility.
This is not to say that volatility and price manipulation in the crypto-asset
market ought to be ignored; instead, it should be dealt with by regulation.
75
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Shubham Raj, ‘After Market: Tuesday Turmoil Costs Equity Investors Rs 1.85 Lakh Crore;
YES Bank, RBL Bleed’ (ET Markets, 1 October 2019) <https://m.economictimes.com/markets/stocks/news/after-market-tuesday-turmoil-costs-equity-investors-rs-1-85-lakh-croreyes-bank-rbl-bleed/articleshow/71394559.cms> accessed 4 June 2020.
Ami Shah and others, ‘Death by a Thousand Cuts! How Rana Kapoor’s ‘Diamond’ YES
Bank Turned into a Smallcap’ (ET Markets: 2 October 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/death-by-a-thousand-cuts-how-rana-kapoors-diamondyes-bank-turned-into-a-smallcap/articleshow/71396716.cms?from=mdr> accessed 4 June
2020.
‘Yes Bank Shares Rally 39% on Binding Offer of $1.2 bn From Global Investor’
(Moneycontrol News, 31 October 2019) <https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/markets/yes-bank-shares-rally-25-on-binding-offer-of-1-2-bn-from-global-investor-4589871.html> accessed 4 June 2020.
Amit Mudgill, ‘Corona Carnage Threatens to Wipe Off Market’s Entire Modi-era Gain
(ET Markets, 23 March 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/
news/corona-carnage-threatens-to-wipe-off-markets-entire-modi-era-gain /articleshow/74771891.cms> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘BVOL: Annualized Historical Volatility Index’ (BitMEX) <https://www.bitmex.com/app/
index/.BVOL> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘Quote Yes Bank Limited–YESBANK’ (NSE as on April 30, 2020 15:30:31 IST) <https://
www1.nseindia.com/live_market/dynaContent/live_watch/get_quote/GetQuoteFO.
jsp?u nderly i ng=Y E SBA N K&i n st r u ment= F U T S T K&t y p e = - & st r i ke = - & ex pi r y=30APR2020> accessed 4 June 2020; ‘Quote Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited–
ZEEL’ (NSE as on April 30, 2020 15:30:31 IST) <https://www1.nseindia.com/live_market/
dynaContent/live_watch/get_quote/GetQuoteFO.jsp?underlying=ZEEL&instrument=FUTSTK&type=-&strike=-&expiry=30APR2020> accessed 4 June 2020.
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This is why securities regulators around the world, including the SEBI, regulate the securities market to a granular level of detail. In fact, the securities market in India in its early stages suffered from the same concerns
stated in the Committee Report. Interestingly, a 1948 Government of India
report titled ‘Report on the Regulation of the Stock Market in India’ by P. J.
Thomas, independent India’s first economic advisor, found as follows:
The enquiry soon disclosed a serious state of things in the stock market, one which clearly demands Government intervention in the public
interest. …
Not only the organisation of the stock market was found defective: its functioning has also often been detrimental to the interests of
investors and of the national economy as a whole. Safety for dealings
is largely non-existent and proper provision does not exist for equity
between parties. Perhaps the most objectionable feature is the violently fluctuating character of prices in the stock market. This has
also worked to the detriment of the investing public. Occasionally
the market is pushed up by reckless bull operators to unwarranted
heights, and the crash that necessarily follows leads to wide-spread
liquidation and loss: even such a pitiable situation, let it be noted, is
utilised by powerful bear syndicates to hammer prices down and to
extort as much money as possible from investors by causing panicky
selling in the market. This has been going on for long in the Indian
stock market…81

This report ultimately recommended regulation (and not prohibition) of
the stock market to counter these negative aspects.
Similarly, any volatility and price manipulation in crypto-asset markets
ought to be dealt with by regulation and not an outright prohibition. Besides
market regulatory measures to prevent sharp price swings and price manipulation, regulators may also consider imposing statutory warnings (akin to
those issued for securities market investments) with respect to the crypto-asset market.
Committee Report’s Reason: Crypto-assets carry risks for the wider
financial system, compromising the ability of central banks to monitor and
stabilise the economy.82

81
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P.J. Thomas, Report on the Regulation of the Stock Market in India (Glasgow Printing Co,
Howrah for the Ministry of Finance-Government of India 1948) (i) <https://www.sebi.gov.
in/sebi_data/commondocs/may-2019/HistoryReport1948_p.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
Committee Report (n 57) 30.
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Response: The Committee Report does not discuss any empirical evidence
to support this reason. Its only analysis in support of this reason is as follows:
Central banks cannot regulate the money supply in the economy if
non-official virtual currencies are widely used, as these are decentralised. This restricts their ability to stabilise the economy. In addition,
cross-border transactions with non-official virtual currencies can violate limits on the inflow and outflow of money, particularly as such
transactions happen irreversibly. This compromises another important lever of monetary policy.

The second point is easily dealt with, since the solution is to regulate cross-border crypto-asset transactions under the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999 (‘FEMA’). FEMA regulates all transfers of value into
and outside India, whether of money or goods and services (including ‘software’).83 Crypto-assets, which are intangible information, can be subject to
the same regime as ‘software’ under FEMA, and their export and import
regulated accordingly.
Regarding the first point on the regulation of money supply and financial
stability, a parallel can again be drawn between crypto-assets on the one
hand and gold and loyalty points systems on the other. The latter are not
legal tender but are widely used in the mainstream economy for the storage and transfer of value and, yet, are not banned. Some aspects relating
to gold are specifically regulated by various Indian laws,84 and holding and
trading it is a lawful activity. Similarly, to this author’s knowledge, loyalty
points systems– despite wide mainstream use among a number of popular
merchants85 – are not specifically regulated86 and would only be subject to
generally applicable laws like the contract law and consumer protection law.
Being similar in many aspects to gold (which is also decentralized and an
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Eg, Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA), ss 2 (l), 2 (p), and 7, which present the definitions of ‘export’, ‘import’, and provision on export of ‘goods’, read with reg
2 (vii), Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations 2015
which gives the definition of ‘software’ and treatment in line with ‘goods’; FEMA, s 5, read
with RBI Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services (RBI/FED/2016-17/12, FED
Master Direction No. 17/2016-17, as amended), which provides for a regime on import of
‘goods’.
Eg, RBI Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services (RBI/FED/2016-17/12, FED
Master Direction No. 17/2016-17, as amended).
The Most Expensive Items Ever Auctioned: Double Eagle Coin (n 64).
Reserve Bank of India, Certificates of Authorisation issued by the Reserve Bank of India
under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 for Setting up and Operating
Payment System in India (2009) <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/
ATH190315ENTPSP.PDF> accessed 4 June 2020, where no authorization(s) appears to
have been issued for loyalty points systems.
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important store of value), crypto-assets can be regulated similarly by the RBI
as far as monetary policy and financial stability goes.
Importantly, there has been no empirical finding by the Committee
Report or the RBI (the regulator of monetary policy and financial stability) showing a current or threatened risk posed by crypto-assets to monetary policy or financial stability. In fact, the RBI publishes detailed biannual
financial stability and monetary policy reports,87 where it empirically analyses the impact of various global and domestic factors on the Indian economy.
These factors include stressed sectors of the economy, asset quality and other
aspects of the health of financial institutions, consumer behaviour, geopolitical risks, global economic conditions, commodity prices (including gold
and oil prices), and U.S. dollar liquidity, among others. On the contrary,
there is no such economic analysis on crypto-assets in the RBI’s financial
stability reports or monetary policy reports barring a high-level summary
on ‘virtual currency’ in 2013.88 That summary included all types of virtual
currencies including in-game virtual currencies, and only concluded that “[t]
he regulators are studying the impact of online payment options and virtual
currencies to determine potential risks associated with them.”89 There has
since been no empirical, economic finding on any such potential risks.
In fact, the RBI found in a 2017 working group report that “their [crypto-assets’] influence on financial services and the wider economy is negligible today, and it is possible that in the long term they may remain a product
for a limited user base on the fringes of mainstream financial services”90
and in its 2018 annual report that “cryptocurrency may not currently pose
systemic risks”.91
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Reserve Bank of India, Half Yearly Financial Stability Report <https://www.rbi.org.in/
Scripts/FsReports.aspx>; <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/HalfYearlyPublications.aspx?head=Monetary%20Policy%20Report> accessed 4 June 2020.
Reserve Bank of India, ‘Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure’ in Financial
Stability Report June 2013 (June 2013) ch III, 62 <https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/
PublicationReportDetails.aspx?ID=709> accessed 4 June 2020.
ibid.
Reserve Bank of India (Central Office-Mumbai), Report of the Working Group on
FinTech and Digital Banking (November 2017) 9 <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/
PublicationReport / Pdfs/ WGFR68A A1890D7334D8F8F72CC2399A 27 F4A.PDF>
accessed 4 June 2020 (Digital Banking report).
Reserve Bank of India, ‘Economic Review’ in Annual Report 2017-18 (August 2018) ch
II, 48 <https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1229> accessed
4 June 2020.

2019

THE CASE FOR REGULATING CRYPTO-ASSETS

401

At a global level, India is a member of both the G20 and the Financial
Stability Board – a global, multilateral expert body – which have found that
crypto-assets do not pose a threat to global financial stability.92
In case an argument is advanced that a ban on crypto-assets is a pre-emptive measure by way of abundant caution to prevent any potential risk to
the financial system, any such pre-emptive measure ought to be – based on
the constitutional principles discussed above – a proportionate and reasoned
decision based on a consideration of the material facts. To find examples of
a proportionate and empirical approach to preventive measures to address
financial stability and monetary policy risks, one need not look further than
the RBI. In its financial stability reports, it provides detailed empirical economic analysis on the performance and risks of financial institutions and
carries out stress tests for factors such as credit risk (including sectoral credit
risk), interest rate risk, equity price risk, and others.93 For preventive measures, it has implemented a Prompt Corrective Action (‘PCA’) framework
which it has described as follows:
The global financial crisis demonstrated the shortcomings of the framework for effective financial crisis management and in many cases the
absence of effective resolution mechanism to handle systemic financial
institutions. A resolution mechanism is put in place when a financial
institution has weakened substantially, but a framework of preventive as well as early intervention measures could potentially arrest the
deterioration in financial institutions in the first place. Putting in place
a prompt corrective action (PCA) framework that incorporates graded
triggers at prespecified levels for taking early actions by the regulators
is important for the financial sectors. …
The Reserve Bank of India initiated a Scheme of Prompt Corrective
Action (PCA) in 2002 in respect of banks which hit certain regulatory
trigger points in terms of capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR),
net non-performing assets (NNPA), and return on assets (RoA). …
Under the Revised PCA framework, apart from the capital, asset quality and profitability, leverage is being monitored additionally. Under
PCA, banks face restrictions on distributing dividends, remitting
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Ministry of Finance, Japan, Communiqué: G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors Meeting (Fukuoka-Japan, 9 June 2019) <http://www.g20.utoronto.
ca/2019/2019-g20-finance-fukuoka.html> accessed 4 June 2020. Financial Stability
Board, Crypto-assets: Report to the G20 on Work by the FSB and Standard-setting Bodies
(16 July 2018) 1 and 6 <https://www.fsb.org/2018/07/crypto-assets-report-to-the-g20-onthe-work-of-the-fsb-and-standard-setting-bodies/> accessed 4 June 2020.
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profits and even on accepting certain kinds of deposits.94 (emphasis
added)

As shown above, PCA is a financial stability measure imposed by the RBI
on particular banks based on a detailed empirical assessment of their asset
quality and other factors. Therefore, even assuming crypto-assets were a
potential threat to financial stability (though the findings are to the opposite effect as discussed above), a proportionate approach by the Committee
to any perceived financial stability or monetary policy concern would have
been to carry out – with the help of the RBI and/or independent economic
experts –an empirical economic analysis of the issue and propose a balanced
response rather than an outright prohibition. An example of such a balanced
response could have been for the Committee Report to recommend that the
RBI (the relevant regulator) monitor whether particular banks hit the regulatory trigger points with regard to any exposure to crypto-asset activity
and impose a suitably tailored form of PCA accordingly. In a similar vein,
in its June 2017 Financial Stability Report, the RBI found that the telecom
and power sectors were stressed sectors of the economy and, therefore, as
a preemptive measure, advised banks to make provisions at higher rates in
respect of advances to stressed sectors of the economy, specifically mentioning the telecom sector.95 There was no outright prohibition on any activities
of these stressed sectors.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court in the IAMAI case noted that the
RBI did not show any semblance of damage to its regulated entities as a
result of their relationship with crypto-asset exchanges.96
Committee Report’s Reason: Crypto-asset transactions are time-consuming and “[t]he large gap in transaction processing speed between cryptocurrencies (especially Bitcoin), and other electronic payment methods, hinders
their ability to be used as medium of exchange [sic].”97
Response: There are over 2000 crypto-assets in existence, some of which
can process thousands of transactions per second, and some of which are

94

95

96
97

Reserve Bank of India, Financial Stability Report Issue 17 (RBI-Financial Stability
Unit, June 2018) 29 <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs//PublicationReport/Pdfs/0FSR_
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much slower.98 However, no crypto-asset network, to the author’s knowledge, takes more than a day to process a transaction. On the contrary, and
by comparison, cheques – a widely accepted and regulated form of payment
– typically take at least a day or two to be processed.99 Ultimately, as stated
above, the State is not an authority to dictate the decisions of its citizens and
other rights-holders. It is up to rights-holders to decide how they wish to
transfer and store value, subject to reasonable restrictions. While some technologies have succeeded, others have failed, and the decisions of the general
public determine which technology will succeed. Meanwhile, if the State
believes, with rational basis, that intervention is necessary, the constitutional
principles above tell us that the answer lies in introducing proportionate consumer protection norms rather than an outright prohibition.
Committee Report’s Reason: “[Cryptocurrencies] provide a degree of
pseudonymity, although not complete anonymity, to participants in a transaction. … In some cases, virtual currencies have made criminal activity
harder to stop, given the pseudonymity they provide and their cross-border
nature.”100
Response: Where criminal activity is suspected, law enforcement authorities have been able to use technology to trace the persons behind Bitcoin
transactions by analyzing the blockchain and de-anonymizing Bitcoin transactions.101 The pseudonymous proprietor of the infamous Silk Road network
too was uncovered and prosecuted (interestingly, through a low-tech method
involving Google searches).102 Law enforcement authorities in India have
also successfully obtained information from Indian crypto-asset exchanges
in order to trace criminal suspects and enforce tax obligations.103 There
98

99

100
101

102
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Zane Witherspoon, ‘A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Consensus Algorithms: A Quick Classification
of Cryptocurrency Consensus Types’ (Hackernoon, 29 November 2017) <https://hackernoon.com/a-hitchhikers-guide-to-consensus-algorithms-d81aae3eb0e3> accessed 4 June
2020.
Eg, State Bank of India, Cheque Collection Policy – 2015 <https://www.sbi.co.in/portal/
web/customer-care/cheque-collection-policy> accessed 4 June 2020.
Committee Report (n 57) 27.
Kelly Phillips Erb, ‘IRS Followed Bitcoin Transactions, Resulting in Takedown of the
Largest Child Exploitation Site on the Web’ (Forbes, 16 October 2019) <https://www.
forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2019/10/16/irs-followed-bitcoin-transactions-resultingin-takedown-of-the-largest-child-exploitation-site-on-the-web/#2c55a0971ed0> accessed
4 June 2020. This fact has also been recognized by the Committee Report, which states,
‘since the underlying Blockchain broadcasts a new transaction whenever it is verified
under the consensus systems, some extent of linkability is possible.’
Nathaniel Popper, ‘The Tax Sleuth Who Took Down a Drug Lord’ (The New York Times,
25 December 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/business/dealbook/the-unsung-tax-agent-who-put-a-face-on-the-silk-road.html> accessed 4 June 2020.
Archana More, ‘Hackers Siphon Off Funds from BoM to Invest in Bitcoin’ (Pune
Mirror,
25
April
2017)
<https://punemirror.indiatimes.com/pune/cover-story/
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are some crypto-assets, known as ‘privacy coins’ (ZCash and Monero are
common examples), where transactions may be difficult to trace if not carried out on an exchange which verifies the identity of its participants.
To the extent that crypto-asset transactions are pseudonymously, universally, and irreversibly recorded on the blockchain, or are carried out on an
exchange which verifies identity, crypto-asset transactions are more traceable than transactions in physical cash or goods which are not recorded on
any such distributed ledger. To the extent that crypto-asset participants may
obfuscate their identity, whether by using privacy coins or otherwise, transactions resemble physical cash or goods transactions, where forensic analysis
may or may not lead to traceability. Therefore, crypto-asset transactions are
either more traceable or at par with physical cash and goods transactions,
depending on the context.
Just as existing laws, including the Information Technology Act, the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
(‘PMLA’), the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Prize Chits and Money Circulation
Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978, FEMA, and other laws are effectively used
to enforce criminal law, tax, and regulatory obligations on participants in
other kinds of transactions, the same laws are already being used to investigate and prosecute fraudulent activity in crypto-asset transactions. For
instance, proponents of the allegedly fraudulent GainBitcoin scheme (cited
in the Committee Report as an instance of criminal activity involving crypto-assets) were arrested and prosecuted on the basis of some of these laws.104
The Central Government has stated in Parliament,
Presently, there is no separate law for dealing with issues relating to
cryptocurrencies. Hence, all concerned Departments and law enforcement agencies, such as RBI, Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax
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articleshow/65406906.cms> accessed 4 June 2020; Outlook Web Bureau, ‘Raj Kundra
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authorities, etc. take action as per the relevant existing laws. Similarly,
police/courts take action on IPC offences.

India has seen a plethora of high-stakes frauds in the securities market,
commodities market, and financial sector over the past few decades;105 yet
these markets continue to be permitted within the bounds of regulation,
with criminal activity prosecuted under the above laws. There is no reason
why the crypto-asset market should be singled out as a case to be prohibited
and not regulated.
In a paper by Nishith Desai Associates, titled ‘Building a Successful
Blockchain Ecosystem for India: Regulatory Approaches to Crypto-Assets’
(the ‘Regulatory Suggestions Paper’), co-authored by this author, we have
proposed a detailed set of regulatory options, including bringing crypto-asset activity within the PMLA and licensing crypto-asset intermediaries like
exchanges, to further address the concerns regarding the use of crypto-assets
for illegal activity.106
Therefore, a mere possibility of use in criminal activity is not a ground for
an outright prohibition, but calls for regulation.
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Speak Asia Scam Mastermind Held’ (Deccan Herald, 27 November 2013) <https://www.
deccanherald.com/content/371301/rs-2276-crore-speak-asia.html> accessed 4 June 2020;
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Committee Report’s Reason: “[Cryptocurrencies] are decentralised networks with no central authority. … Transactions are irreversible, and if a
wrong transaction is made, there is no method of redress.”107
Response: Examples of decentralized phenomena which are not banned
include: commodities, including gold and other precious metals; and the
Internet. To take the example of gold, there is no central authority which
issues gold or regulates its supply. Similarly, there is no central authority
regulating messages or content on the Internet. With regard to irreversibility,
transactions in physical cash and goods, and the messages on the Internet
are also irreversible. A mistakenly sent email or message online cannot be
recalled except if the relevant intermediaries allow it. The handing over of
physical cash or physical goods cannot be ‘reversed’ except by consent, contract, or by process of law. With respect to the Internet, consumers have
recourse mainly because of the intermediaries they deal with e.g., financial
institutions or e-commerce businesses, and not because the Internet has any
grievance redressal mechanism of its own. Similarly, consumers are protected with respect to physical cash or goods transactions by merchants and
generally applicable laws like criminal laws and consumer protection laws,
rather than any feature of the cash or goods themselves.
To this extent, crypto-assets are at par with the above phenomena. The
lack of a central authority or the irreversibility of transactions is therefore
not a cause for an outright ban. However, intermediaries in the crypto-asset
space perform a crucial function because they may hold consumer assets and
funds in trust and settle purchase and sale transactions. To that extent, they
resemble custodians or securities market intermediaries.108 Our Regulatory
Suggestions Paper proposes that such intermediaries should be licensed and
supervised, and suggests the routes under Indian law by which this can be
done.109
Committee Report’s Reason: “Miners of a currency can collude to earn
more revenue by “forking”, a currency, or changing the programming protocol to benefit themselves. This could put consumers’ finances at risk.”110
Response: The extent of control of miners (who are essentially validators of transactions) over a crypto-asset network varies according to the
particular crypto-asset. Many new crypto-assets have tried to avoid the
107
108

109
110

Committee Report (n 57) 27 and 29.
This is not to say that crypto-assets are necessarily ‘securities’ (see the Regulatory
Suggestions Paper, supra).
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concentration of power in particular miners, eg, Algorand.111 In any event,
the control of miners or other participants on a crypto-asset network is akin
to the control of a Board of Directors or majority shareholders over a company. Participants in a crypto-asset network should do their due diligence
on the technology underlying the network, the development team, and other
participants in the network, just as shareholders in a company should do
their due diligence on the management and fundamentals of a company.
This is not to say that the issue of potentially mala fide forking in certain
crypto-assets should be left unaddressed. Rather, just as shareholders’ rights
are protected in companies, regulation (rather than an outright prohibition)
should be introduced to protect consumers. Because crypto-assets are generally global networks, with participants scattered around the world, such
regulation should ideally be introduced by way of a multilateral treaty at the
international level. Because a less invasive measure is available and because a
similar phenomenon (shareholder rights) is addressed differently, an outright
prohibition on this ground would be disproportionate and arbitrary.
Committee Report’s Reason: “The loss of a private key, analogous to a
password, of a virtual currency wallet could mean that the amount held
in the wallet is lost permanently. … Balances in wallets can be stolen by
the use of malware, and there is evidence that such malware is resistant to
anti-virus software.”112
Response: This reason is essentially a cybersecurity concern. Interestingly,
there were 53,081 cyber-security incidents in India during the year 2017
alone.113 This was stated by the Minister for electronics and information
technology in 2018, who also stated, “[w]ith the proliferation and vast
expansion of Information Technology and related services, there is a rise in
instances of cyber crimes including financial frauds, using bank cards and
e-wallets in the country like elsewhere in the world.”114 Cybersecurity concerns are endemic to all online businesses, including regulated financial intermediaries and other established enterprises. Indian corporations which have
been subjected to cyberattacks include Axis Bank, Bank of Maharashtra,
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Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, ‘ALGORAND’ (2016) <https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/
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Cosmos Bank, Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation (IRCTC),
Reliance Jio, Star, and Union Bank.115
Cyber-crimes are actionable under the Information Technology Act,
2000.116 The Information Technology Act also prescribes reasonable security
practices and procedures with regard to sensitive personal data or information. Crypto-asset activity is also subject to this regime.117 If crypto-assets
are subject to heightened cybersecurity risk, there is no reason why heightened obligations cannot be prescribed under the Information Technology
Act for crypto-asset intermediaries.118
As far as the loss of a private key is concerned, many crypto-asset intermediaries provide a ‘forgot password’ facility if they are in control of the
crypto-assets.119 If they do not, the answer lies in an analogy with the physical world. The loss of valuable things is an issue as old as civilization, and it
can only be addressed by the holder exercising due care and caution, and the
legal system prosecuting theft.
In addition, there is no evidence provided as to how malware targeting
crypto-asset wallets is any more resistant to security / anti-virus software
than any other type of malware. It is well-known that in the cybersecurity
sphere in general, malware developers and security researchers are involved
in an ongoing ‘technological arms-race’.120
Therefore, cybersecurity is not a reason to prohibit the use of crypto-assets. A proportionate approach would require any cybersecurity concerns to
be addressed through regulation and not a prohibition.
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articleshow/61074845.cms> accessed 4 June 2020.
Eg, s 66.
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There is a fairly broad power to make rules under s 87 of the Information Technology Act
2000.
Eg, Unocoin <https://www.unocoin.com/in> accessed 4 June 2020; Coinbase <https://
www.coinbase.com/password_resets/new> accessed 4 June 2020.
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Committee Report’s Reason: “The mining of non-official virtual currencies is very resource intensive. … Already, Bitcoin mining has used as
much electricity as all of Switzerland, with the [Bank for International
Settlements’] report terming it an environmental disaster. ... The diversion
of such large amounts of energy resources to mining virtual currencies can
have unfavourable long-term economic consequences. Further, the energy-intensive nature of cryptocurrencies must be examined along with the
data localisation requirements proposed by the RBI as well as the proposed
Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018. The proposed Bill provides that the
Central Government may notify categories of personal data that shall only
be stored or processed in India. Reading that with another provision, which
already provides for at least one copy of personal data to be stored in India,
cryptocurrencies could potentially take up an enormous amount of energy
in an already power-starved India.”121
Response: The Committee Report provides no data on how much electricity is consumed by crypto-asset mining in India. It also does not attempt
to provide an estimate of the same. While the statement that Bitcoin mining
has used as much electricity as all of Switzerland initially appears convincing
as a supporting fact, it breaks down on closer analysis. The data shows that
74% of Bitcoin mining nodes are concentrated in 10 countries, and India
is not even in the top 20 countries.122 Japan, which is ranked number 10,
contributes to 2.04% of Bitcoin mining nodes. While data regarding the
percentage contribution to Bitcoin mining of India does not appear to be
available, given its rank at number 28, it can be surmised to contribute significantly less than 2.04%. The United States and Germany, the top 2 countries, contribute to 25.70% and 20.06% of mining nodes respectively, and
neither have prohibited crypto-asset activity but take regulatory approaches
towards it. Interestingly, Switzerland, a country with a population less than
Bengaluru,123 is number 13 on the list (implying that Bitcoin mining is a
non-trivial proportion of its electricity consumption). Still, Switzerland does
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Committee Report (n 57) 29 and 30.
Datalight
<https://datalight.me/blog/researches/infographics/datalight-publishes-a-listof-countries-with-the-largest-number-of-bitcoin-nodes/> accessed 4 June 2020; Matthew
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not prohibit Bitcoin mining but regulates crypto-asset activity in a nuanced
manner.124
Regarding the potential consequences of the draft Personal Data Protection
Bill, 2018, the Committee Report does not analyze why the effect of any
data localization requirements on the crypto-asset industry would be more
than the effect on any other industry e.g., online cloud storage platforms.
According to Fortune, data centers consume about 2% of electricity worldwide whereas Bitcoin is estimated to consume much less (between 0.165%
and 0.33% of electricity worldwide).125
Interestingly, the Committee Report cited a study to state that an estimated 19 households in the United States can be powered for one day by
the electricity consumed in a single Bitcoin transaction. By contrast, the
Fortune report mentioned above contained this anecdote: “The music video
for “Despacito” set an Internet record in April 2018… In the process,
‘Despacito’ reached a less celebrated milestone: it burned as much energy
as 40,000 U.S. homes use in a year.”126 Yet it could be nobody’s case that
there should be a ban on online cloud or streaming services due to energy
consumption.
In any case, technological advances are reducing the energy consumption
concern. In November 2018, Intel was awarded a patent for “energy-efficient
high performance bitcoin mining”.127 Further, many newer crypto-assets are
more energy-efficient than Bitcoin,128 and new consensus mechanisms like
proof-of-stake could end concerns about energy consumption.129
Still, if the Committee was apprehensive about the impact of crypto-asset
mining on power consumption, it ought to have sought an expert opinion
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nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06610-y> accessed 4 June 2020.
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2019)
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on the topic based on empirical data and scientific analysis. Energy consumption is an inherently statistics-driven field. None of the Committee’s
members were experts in the field. The Ministry of Power has, to the author’s
knowledge, to date expressed no concern on the energy consumption associated with crypto-assets.130 Instead of an empirical analysis, however,
the Committee Report has made a speculative statement that crypto-asset
activity “could have unfavourable long-term economic consequences” and
“could potentially take up an enormous amount of energy in an already
power-starved India”. In the event any negative impact of crypto-assets
on energy consumption in India is actually found after a scientific study,
it should be addressed by proportionate regulation rather than an outright
prohibition.

VI. O ther I nfirmities

in the

Committee R eport

The Committee Report also suffers from the following defects:
1. Contradictions with other government reports: A ‘Steering Committee
on Fintech Related Issues’131 (‘Steering Committee’) released its report
in September 2019. Significantly, the Steering Committee was chaired
by the same official who chaired the Committee. MeitY, RBI, and
SEBI, which were also part of the Committee, were also represented
on the Steering Committee. Yet, the Steering Committee, whose
report was published a few months after the Committee Report,
acknowledged the benefits associated with crypto-assets and did not
discuss any of the disadvantages cited in the Committee Report.132
Similarly, other government reports as well as publications of reputed
130

131

132

Based on an automated search of Ministry of Power-Government of India <https://powermin.nic.in/> accessed 4 June 2020.
Department of Economic Affairs, Report of the Steering Committee on Fintech Related
Issues (Ministry of Finance-Government of India, 2019) 43 <https://dea.gov.in/sites/
default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Steering%20Committee%20on%20Fintech.pdf>
accessed 4 June 2020 (Steering Committee report).
The Steering Committee report (n 131) 11, 16, 20 and 21 states, “However, the broader
fintech landscape all over the world comprises of a variety of day-to-day financial services
enhanced by technology. Mobile payments, cryptocurrency, investment advisory, insurance aggregators, peer-to-peer lending and some more services which traditionally required
human capital, now form the fintech landscape. fintech comprises of technology-based
businesses that compete against, enable and/or collaborate with financial institutions. …
Cryptography, as an instrument for fintech, has four key benefits for financial firms: (a)
confidentiality, (b) privacy, (c) non-repudiation, and (d) integrity. … Cryptography also
forms the backbone of DLT and blockchain based systems such as Virtual Currencies. …
1.2.3 Digital currencies and tokens … The mechanisms surrounding cryptocurrencies, particularly the Blockchain and Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), are revolutionising the global
fintech landscape. The issue of initial coin offerings has emerged as an innovative way
of capital raising by fintech businesses. … ICOs generally operate as blockchain-based
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institutions have acknowledged both benefits and risks associated
with crypto-assets.133 The Committee Report, however, presents a
one-sided picture, discussing none of the benefits associated with
crypto-assets. The contradictions between the Committee Report
and these other government reports, and the fact of the Committee
Report not considering any benefits of crypto-assets (which are material facts which were readily available and ought to have been considered), disclose a non-application of mind that could well be found to
fall foul of Article 14 in the event the Draft Bill is enacted into law.
2. Lack of deliberation: The Committee held three formal meetings over
its 15-month tenure: on November 27, 2017, February 22, 2018, and
January 9, 2019. Until the third meeting, the Committee was split as to
whether crypto-assets should be regulated or prohibited. In fact, minutes of the first meeting record that the Committee agreed that “[t]he
banning option is very difficult to implement. It may also drive some
operators underground which may encourage use of such ‘currencies’ for illegitimate purposes.”134 In the second meeting on February
22, 2018,135 two members favoured a regulatory approach and two
members favoured the banning approach, with the Chairman appearing to lean towards the regulatory option. The Secretary, MeitY, in
fact stated that “India, being a very large economy and in the forefront of technological innovation, should have [an] open attitude
towards this phenomenon and develop its options accordingly.” The
Committee then resolved that the Department of Economic Affairs
and SEBI would each prepare papers, including a draft law, on the
option of regulating crypto-asset activity, while the RBI and CBDT
would prepare detailed papers, along with a draft law, on the option
of banning crypto-asset activity. However, in the third meeting, held
almost a year later, the Committee abruptly appears to have decided
on a prohibition and approved a draft report and bill to this effect.136

133

134
135
136

funding process that enables the issuance of virtual coins or tokens in exchange for fiat
currency or cryptocurrency payment.”
Ministry of Finance-Government of India, Committee on Digital Payments Medium
Term Recommendations to Strengthen Digital Payments Ecosystem Report (December
2016) <https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/watal_report271216.pdf> accessed 4 June
2020; Digital Banking report (n 90); Institute for Development and Research in Banking
Technology, Blueprint of Platform for Banking Sector and Beyond (IDRBT, White
Paper, January 2019) <https://www.idrbt.ac.in/assets/publications/Best%20Practices/
BCT_2019.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020; Institute for Development and Research in Banking
Technology (n 6).
Committee Report (n 57) 82.
Committee Report (n 57) 84-85.
Committee Report (n 57) 90-93.
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There is no reasoning provided anywhere in the minutes or elsewhere
in the Committee Report as to why prohibition was chosen rather
than regulation, especially when members of the Committee were
actively considering regulation in just the previous meeting.
		 Every new technology comes with its share of risks and potential
abuse, eg, the Internet as a vehicle for fraud and child pornography.
Merely reciting the risks associated with a technology would not show
application of mind as to a regulatory solution. The Committee’s
approach, if followed for the Internet, may have resulted in a law banning the use of the Internet. The Committee Report does not engage
with why a balanced regulatory solution, or any measure less invasive
than a ban, was not appropriate. Given the constitutional law precedents above emphasizing the importance of rational deliberation, this
lack of reasoning in the Committee Report on the choice of a prohibition, and the unexplained change in approach from one meeting to
the next, demonstrates a non-application of mind.
3. Lack of expertise and representation: Despite crypto-assets being
a technical subject, the Committee did not consist of any technical
experts on mathematics, cryptography, crypto-assets or blockchain
technology, or any private sector representatives from the software
or technical community in India or globally. On the other hand,
reports of the IDRBT, a technical body and a government institution set up by the RBI, recognize the benefits associated with crypto-assets.137 Similarly, the Secretary, MeitY, as stated above, was wary
of a prohibitive approach. The Committee Report does not engage
with the question of why the benefits of crypto-assets should not be
allowed to develop in India. Further, as stated above, though the RBI
was represented on the Committee, the Committee Report and the
annexed minutes do not indicate whether any theoretical or empirical
economic analysis was done on the impact of crypto-assets on the
economy. Therefore, as far as both technology and economics are
concerned, the Committee Report indicates a lack of expert study.
4. Vagueness: Moreover, certain key provisions of the Draft Bill are
legally and conceptually vague. For instance, the very definition of the
term ‘Cryptocurrency’ appears to be misdirected138 and the operative
137

138

Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology (n 133); Institute for
Development and Research in Banking Technology (n 6).
The said definition in cl 2(1)(a) reads as follows, “‘Cryptocurrency’, by whatever name
called, means any information or code or number or token not being part of any Official
Digital Currency, generated through cryptographic means or otherwise, providing a
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clauses imposing the prohibition appear to conflict with each other.139
Further, unless the State purchases the crypto-assets held by existing
holders, it is unclear how such holders are expected to dispose of
these crypto-assets, since there would be no willing buyer in India
(in view of the threat of criminal prosecution) and there is no clarity
on selling to a foreign buyer under FEMA.140 Regardless of the policy
position ultimately taken, the Draft Bill needs to be overhauled by
the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law and Justice. As it
currently stands, it could well be argued that it is unconstitutionally
vague.
5. ‘Blockchain good, crypto bad’ narrative: There is a popular narrative, including in the Committee Report, that blockchain technology
is desirable while crypto-assets are undesirable. However, a closer
examination of the technology suggests otherwise. In a blockchain
network with a native crypto-asset, it is the crypto-asset which acts
as the incentive to participants to validate transactions. Traditionally,
a central party (such as a clearing agency) would validate transactions in exchange for fees, but in crypto-asset networks, the entire
network of participants validates transactions in exchange for the
crypto-asset as mining rewards or transaction fees. This distributes
the risk associated with a central party. While there can be ‘blockchain’ or distributed ledger technology implementations which do
not use a crypto-asset, any blockchain implementation which seeks
to be minimize centralization by incentivizing a wide variety of participants will need to have a crypto-asset. These are usually, but not
always, public blockchains. This understanding has been expressly
confirmed by multiple computer scientists and blockchain technology experts, including Arvind Narayanan, Associate Professor,

139

140

digital representation of value which is exchanged with or without consideration, with
the promise or representation of having inherent value in any business activity which may
involve risk of loss or an expectation of profits or income, or functions as a store of value
or a unit of account and includes its use in any financial transaction or investment, but not
limited to, investment schemes.” (emphasis added).
Cls 8(1) and (2) appear not to reconcile with each other, since they provide different punishments for the same offences. Cl 8(1) provides a certain punishment for the violation of
‘clauses (e), (g) and/or (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 7’ and cl 8(2) refers to ‘subsection
(1) of section 7 or clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and/or (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 7’. The text
in bold indicates overlap between the two, and therefore, uncertainty on the punishment
provided for (emphasis provided).
RBI response dated May 9, 2018, to Varun Sethi, stating, ‘Virtual Currency is not recognized as currency under Section 2(h) of Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA).
Hence, no guidelines have been framed on virtual currencies under FEMA.’ <https://drive.
google.com/file/d/1TeePIKQx5G--mg5dsDMHfcH89q7dUHzM/view?usp=drive_open>
accessed 4 June 2020.

2019

THE CASE FOR REGULATING CRYPTO-ASSETS

415

Princeton University;141 Vitalik Buterin, co-founder, Ethereum (one
of the leading blockchain networks used by both enterprises and
governments);142 and Andreas Antonopoulos, author, ‘Mastering
Bitcoin’ and ‘Internet of Money’;143 and implicitly by Turing award
winners and Massachusetts Institute of Technology professors who
have developed the crypto-asset system ‘Algorand’.144 There is also
literature to suggest that ‘private blockchains’ are not particularly
innovative, and have been in existence since the 1990s.145 The following are some examples showing that crypto-assets are demonstrably
intertwined with blockchain technology:
• ‘Bankchain’ (an alliance of over 35 reputed banks and institutions including State Bank of India SBI, HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank,
Deutsche Bank, Citibank, and National Payments Corporation of
India (NPCI)), whose slogan is ‘Blockchain for Banks’ and which
is the leading body in the Indian financial sector seeking to implement blockchain technology, cited the use of a “crypto-token” for its
use-cases.146
• The Enterprise Ethereum Alliance, which is a global consortium of
over 500 reputed institutions globally, including Accenture, Deloitte,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, HP, Infosys, J.P. Morgan, Microsoft,
and Samsung seeking to implement blockchain technology, uses the
Ethereum blockchain, which natively has a crypto-asset, Ether.147
• The IDRBT report titled ‘Blueprint of Blockchain Platform for
Banking Sector and Beyond’ (2019) contains multiple references to

141

142

143

144
145
146

147

Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark (n 4); Arvind Narayan, ‘“Private Blockchain” is Just a
Confusing Name for a Shared Database’ (Freedom to Tinker, 18 September 2015) <https://
freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/09/18/private-blockchain-is-just-a-confusing-name-for-ashared-database/> accessed 4 June 2020.
Allen Scott, ‘Vitalik Buterin: Russia’s Crypto Ban Would Stifle Blockchains’ (Bitcoin.com,
17 May 2016) <https://news.bitcoin.com/buterin-ban-russia-stifle-blockchains/> accessed
4 June 2020.
Andreas Antonopoulos, ‘Bitcoin Q&A: “Blockchain, not Bitcoin”’ (YouTube: aantonop, 7
June 2018) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2f0HlaRdgo> accessed 4 June 2020.
Yossi Gilad (n 5).
Arvind Narayanan (n 141); Also see (n 7 and n 8).
Eg, A Bankchain document titled ‘Primechain-P5: The Blockchain for Moving Money
Globally’ dated 19 March 2018, on file with the author, states a ‘key feature’ of the solution
to be ‘[r]eal world asset-backed crypto tokens provide liquidity’ and that ‘[b]lockchains are
provably immutable and enable the rapid transfer and exchange of crypto-tokens (which
can represent assets) without the need for separate clearing, settlement and reconciliation.’
(emphasis added).
Enterprise Ethereum Alliance <https://entethalliance.org/> accessed 4 June 2020.
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the use of the Ethereum blockchain network (which functions based
on the crypto-asset Ether) as well as to the term “digital assets”.148
• A report co-authored by the National Association of Software and
Services Companies (NASSCOM), whose members include Infosys,
Microsoft, Wipro, Cognizant, Tata Consultancy Services and many
others, states,
		 “There is need for positive signaling from the Government of India,
and efforts to drive the growth of the Blockchain ecosystem in India
through provision of timely and well-defined regulatory guidance. …
India needs to act fast and work consultatively with the key stakeholders in the crypto/blockchain community and provide regulatory
certainty and clarity around blockchain technology (specifically
around cryptocurrencies and digital tokens).”149 (emphasis added)
		 A subsequent statement of NASSCOM – after taking note of the
Committee Report – recommends a regulatory rather than prohibitory stance towards crypto-assets.150
• Similarly, a study by Incrypt, a non-profit organisation, based on
a survey of 97 blockchain software developers in India, found that
open, public blockchains (powered by crypto-assets) can be a new
growth driver of the Indian economy in a similar manner that the IT
services industry was, and that 84% of the blockchain developers surveyed believed that if the government does not allow crypto-assets,
they may move abroad or only work on foreign projects / startups.151
The above reasoning may have been dealt a blow by the decision in the
IAMAI case which states that distributed ledger technology and virtual

148
149

150

151

Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology (n 133).
NASSCOM Avasant India Blockchain Report 2019 <https://www.nasscom.in/knowledge-center/publications/nasscom-avasant-india-blockchain-report-2019> accessed 4 June
2020.
“NASSCOM believes that the recent proposal of the Inter-ministerial Committee of the
Government to ban all cryptocurrencies barring those that are backed by the Government,
is not the most constructive measure. Instead, the government should work towards developing a risk based framework to regulate and monitor cryptocurrencies and tokens. A ban
would inhibit new applications and solutions from being deployed and would discourage
tech Startups. It would handicap India from participating in new use cases that cryptocurrencies and tokens offer.” NASSCOM, Banning Cryptocurrency is not the Solution, a
Regulatory Framework must be Developed: NASSCOM(2019) <https://www.nasscom.
in/sites/default/files/media_pdf/Banning_cryptocurrencies_is_not_the_solution_a_regulatory_framework_must_be_developed.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
Incrypt, The Incrypt Policy Report: Realising India’s Blockchain Potential (August 2018)
22 <https://www.incrypt.co/policy> accessed 4 June 2020.
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currencies can be separated.152 However, the Court does not appear to have
entered into a consideration of the above factors. Moreover, it is not being
contended in this article that there can be no distributed ledger technology
/ blockchain technology without crypto-assets. It is only being stated that
crypto-assets are essential to many important applications of blockchain
technology, as demonstrated by the examples above. In the words of Vitalik
Buterin, one of the foremost experts in the space and the person who conceived of the Ethereum network, “if there’s no cryptocurrency […] then at
least public blockchains would not work. Private chains could if some kind
of solution is developed but the blockchain as a system would be severely
restricted.”153 Therefore, the Committee Report’s stated recommendation to
promote distributed ledger technology would mean that what would be promoted is a limited, narrow use of the technology, rather than its full potential. There is no discussion of this nuance in the Committee Report.

VII. Comparative P erspective
The G20 is an international forum consisting of the world’s leading economies, which is recognized as the “premier forum for international economic
cooperation”.154 According to a 2014 statement, G20 members represented
around 85 per cent of global gross domestic product, over 75 per cent of
global trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population.155 The members of
the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and European
Union.156
While these jurisdictions differ in political and constitutional values,
none of the G20 members have introduced an outright ban on crypto-asset
activity. The Draft Bill, if introduced, would be the most extreme measure

152
153
154

155

156

IAMAI case paras 6.136 and 6.137.
Scott (n 142).
G20 2020 Saudi Arabia, About the G20 (g20.org) <https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/default.
aspx> accessed 4 June 2020.
G20 Australia 2014, G20 Members <https://web.archive.org/web/20140203221840/
http://www.g20.org/about_g20/g20_members> accessed 4 June 2020.
G20 2020 Saudi Arabia, G20 Participants (g20.org) <https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/
Participants.aspx> accessed 4 June 2020.
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introduced by any of these jurisdictions. China,157 India,158 Indonesia,159 and
Saudi Arabia160 are the countries which currently contain severe restrictions
on crypto-asset activity, although none of these restrictions amount to an
outright ban in the nature of the Draft Bill. More importantly, jurisdictions
which India draws guidance from and whose constitutional values resemble
those of India, including Australia,161 Canada,162 the European Union

157

158

159

160

161

162

Chi Jingyi, ‘Ruling Signals Nation Likely to Loosen Controls Over Digital Currencies’
(Global Times, 18 July 2019) <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1158377.shtml>
accessed 4 June 2020; Jacob Blacklock and Steve Shi, ‘China’ in Josias Dewey (ed),
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation 2020 (2nd edn, Global Legal Insights 2020)
<https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/
china> accessed 7 June 2020.
The RBI circular dated 6 April 2018, prohibiting banks and other financial institutions
from facilitating crypto-asset transactions (which was set aside by the Supreme Court in
the IAMAI case). <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11243&Mode=0> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘Futures Exchange Authority Issues Regulation on Cryptocurrency’ (The Jakarta Post, 13
February 2019) <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/02/13/futures-exchange-authority-issues-regulation-on-cryptocurrency.html> accessed 4 June 2020; Regulation of
Cryptocurrency Around the World (Law Library of Congress, June 2018) <https://www.
loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
‘The Virtual Currencies Are Not Regulated Inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (Saudi
Arabian Monetary Authority, 12 August 2018) <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/News/
Pages/news12082018.aspx> accessed 4 June 2020; ‘A Statement on Launching “Aber”
Project’ (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, January 2019) <http://www.sama.gov.sa/
en-US/News/Pages/news29012019.aspx> accessed 4 June 2020; Stephen O’Neal, ‘From
Qatar to Palestine: How Cryptocurrencies Are Regulated in the Middle East’ (Coin
Telegraph, 4 September 2018) <https://cointelegraph.com/news/from-qatar-to-palestine-how-cryptocurrencies-are-regulated-in-the-middle-east> accessed 4 June 2020.
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Senate Inquiry into Digital Currency,
Submission by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Submission 44,
December 2014) <http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=4b6d105f-3e0a-4d52aaab-1f35842ed5f1&subId=302297> accessed 4 June 2020; Webb Henderson, ‘Australia’
in The Virtual Currency Regulation Review (The Law Reviews, 2nd edn, November
2018)
<https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176625/australia> accessed 4 June 2020; Peter Reeves, ‘Australia’ in Josias Dewey
(ed), Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation 2020 (Global Legal Insights, 2nd edn,
2020) <https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/australia> accessed 4 June 2020.
Alix d’Anglejan-Chatillon and others, ‘Canada’ in The Virtual Currency Regulation
Review (The Law Reviews, 2nd edn, November 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/
the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176638/canada> accessed 04 June 2020;
Canadian Staff Notice, Guidance on the Application of Securities Legislation to Entities
Facilitating the Trading of Crypto Assets (CSA Staff Notice 21-327, 16 January 2020)
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category2/csa_20200116_21-327_
trading-crypto-assets.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
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(‘E.U.’),163 South Africa,164 the United Kingdom,165 and the United States166
all allow crypto-asset activity within the bounds of regulation. Other common law jurisdictions not in the list, such as Hong Kong,167 New Zealand,168
and Singapore,169 too follow this approach.

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

European Commission, ‘Strengthened EU Rules to Prevent Money Laundering and
Terrorism Financing’ (European Commission Fact Sheet, 15 July 2018, vol VI, annex A
22) <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=610991> accessed 4
May 2020; Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending
Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018L0843> accessed 4 June 2020.
Angela Itzikowitz and Ina Meiring, ‘South Africa’ in Josias Dewey (ed), Blockchain and
Cryptocurrency Regulation 2020 (Global Legal Insights, 2nd edn, 2020) <https://www.
globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/south-africa>
accessed 4 June 2020; Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World (Law Library
of Congress, June 2018) <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf.> accessed 4 June 2020.
Peter Chapman and Laura Douglas, ‘UK’ in The Virtual Currency Regulation Review (The
Law Reviews, 2nd edn, November 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176672/united-kingdom> accessed 4 June 2020;
Stuart Davis, Sam Maxson, and Andrew C. Moyle, ‘United Kingdom’ in Josias Dewey (ed),
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation 2020 (2nd edn, Global Legal Insights 2020)
<https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/
united-kingdom> accessed 6 June 2020; UK Government, Cryptoassets Taskforce: Final
Report (October 2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752070/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_
web.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
Michael S. Sackheim and others, ‘USA’ in The Virtual Currency Regulation Review (The
Law Reviews, 2nd edn, November 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176673/united-states> accessed 4 June 2020;
Joe Dewey, ‘USA’ in Josias Dewey (ed), Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation 2020
(Global Legal Insights, 2nd edn, 2020) <https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/usa> accessed 4 June 2020.
Henry Yu, ‘Hong Kong’ in Josias Dewey (ed), Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation
2020 (2nd edn, Global Legal Insights 2020) <https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/hong-kong> accessed 4 June 2020.
Deemple Budhia and Tom Hunt, ‘New Zealand’ in The Virtual Currency Regulation
Review (2nd edn, The Law Reviews, November 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176659/new-zealand>
accessed
4 June 2020; Individual income tax (Questions & Answers: Cryptocurrency and tax),
New Zealand Inland Revenue (undated) <https://www.classic.ird.govt.nz/income-tax-individual/cryptocurrency-qa.html> accessed 4 June 2020; Tax Information Bulletin,
Inland Revenue Department (July 2019) <https://www.classic.ird.govt.nz/resources/1/
c/1c6029d0-611c-4a15-9cbf-b712129ab76c/tib-vol31-no7.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
Laney Zhang, ‘Singapore: Payment Services Act Passed, Regulating Cryptocurrency
Dealing or Exchange Services’(Global Legal Monitor, 17 April 2019) <https://www.loc.
gov/law/foreign-news/article/singapore-payment-services-act-passed-regulating-cryptocurrency-dealing-or-exchange-services/> accessed 4 June 2020; Adrian Ang V-Meng
and others, ‘Singapore’ in The Virtual Currency Regulation Review (2nd edn, The Law
Reviews, November 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-virtual-currency-regulation-review-edition-1/1176666/singapore> accessed 4 June 2020.
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This is not to say that India should not think for itself. However, all of
these jurisdictions, as well as the G20 as a body, have recognized that there
are risks associated with crypto-assets, and the risks they recognize resemble
some of the risks cited in the Committee Report. However, their reaction
has not been to resort to an outright prohibition. They have sought to extend
existing laws to crypto-asset activities and develop new regulations where
necessary (specific anti-money-laundering laws in Canada and the E.U. being
examples). There are at least 41 significant jurisdictions adopting a regulatory approach (these include countries with foreign exchange controls, such
as South Africa).170 While all of these laws are in their infancy, and may well
require reiteration as the technology progresses, the key learning for India is
that the risks cited in the Committee Report do not necessitate a prohibition.
The international experience hence shows that less invasive measures are
available, and that there is no reason why India cannot regulate crypto-asset
technology – giving a nod to both liberty and innovation – rather than prohibiting it outright.
The Supreme Court in the IAMAI case appears to deal a blow to the comparative approach by rejecting it in the context of the RBI circular on virtual
currencies.171 However, it does so because: (a) of India’s statutory scheme,
(b) of India’s economic conditions, and (c) it appears to consider whether
the global approach was by itself a ground to challenge the RBI circular.
However, the reason for the comparative approach in this article is on a different footing: (a) since the Draft Bill is itself a statute, it is the constitutional
scheme that is relevant and not the statutory scheme; (b) the comparative
approach can be applied if it is shown that the impact of crypto-assets on
India’s economic condition is not unique to India; and (c) most importantly,
the comparative approach in this article is not intended to be a ground of
challenge in itself, but to merely act as persuasive evidence demonstrating the
availability of less invasive measures to address a similar problem. The Court
in the IAMAI case in fact endorses this approach since it referred to an E.U.
Parliament report rejecting an outright ban while examining whether the
RBI had considered the availability of alternative, less invasive measures.172
170

171
172

Based on the author’s analysis as of August 2019, these jurisdictions are as follows: 1.
Argentina, 2. Australia, 3. Brazil, 4. Canada, 5. The EU, 6. France, 7. Germany, 8. Italy, 9.
Japan, 10. Mexico, 11. Russia, 12. South Africa, 13. South Korea, 14. Turkey, 15. UK, 16.
USA, 17. Austria, 18.Belgium, 19. Czech Republic, 20. Denmark, 21. Finland, 22. Greece,
23. Hong Kong, 24. Hungary, 25. Iceland, 26. Ireland, 27. Israel, 28. Malaysia, 29. Malta,
30. Netherlands, 31. New Zealand, 32. Norway, 33. Philippines, 34. Poland, 35. Portugal,
36. Singapore, 37. Spain, 38. Sweden, 39. Switzerland, 40. Taiwan, 41. Thailand.
IAMAI case paras 6.129 and 6.130.
IAMAI case paras 6.162-6.164.
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VIII. Conclusion: I s the Draft Bill A R easonable
R estriction?
The IAMAI case, in its setting aside of the RBI circular on virtual currencies, is a powerful affirmation that the Supreme Court’s long-established
principles of proportionality squarely apply to the crypto-asset sphere.
For the reasons stated in this article, the Draft Bill is unlikely to be a
reasonable and proportionate restriction on the fundamental rights named
above. It proposes an imprisonment term of up to 10 years for the use of
‘cryptocurrency’ for nearly any purpose, including buying, selling, storing,
and providing ‘cryptocurrency-related services’.173 As stated in the Aadhaar
case, cited above, the presumption of criminality is treated as disproportionate and there cannot be sweeping provisions targeting entire categories
of persons (in this case, persons dealing with crypto-assets, estimated to be
50 lakh in number) as suspicious. In line with the Chintaman Rao case, the
banning of legitimate activity has no rational connection to, and goes much
in excess of, the purpose of the draft legislation, which is only intended to
curb unlawful activity, protect consumers, and preserve financial stability.
As shown by the above point-by-point responses, none of the Committee
Report’s reasons in support of the Draft Bill hold up to close scrutiny when
one examines whether they can be used to justify an outright prohibition.
Further, any remaining concerns which are legitimate can be effectively
addressed with less invasive measures. There is no rational basis for the
proposed prohibition or for why less invasive measures cannot be implemented to achieve the Draft Bill’s objectives. Even violations of FEMA –
which is a statute with similar aims to the Draft Bill – are civil offences and
not criminal offences; moreover, FEMA is a regulatory statute and not an
outright prohibition. Similarly, the PMLA provides checks and balances on
various sectors prone to money laundering (eg, real estate and precious metals),174 rather than ban such activities altogether. We have suggested many
less invasive options for crypto-asset regulation in India in our Regulatory
Suggestions Paper.175 The international experience, summarized above, also
provides persuasive evidence to show that a variety of less invasive measures
are available to address the same concerns.
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In fact, as the Committee itself recognized in its first meeting, and as discussed in our Regulatory Suggestions Paper,176 banning crypto-asset activity
is likely to be counter-productive. Legitimate activity is stopped while the
government loses oversight of illegitimate activity, which can in fact be monitored through the records maintained by regulated crypto-asset exchanges
and wallet providers. The government has already used the records maintained by crypto-asset exchanges to aid in its criminal investigations and
prosecutions. A ban on crypto-asset activity would remove this important
law enforcement aid. Signs of this counter-productive effect already emerged
after the RBI circular on virtual currencies.177
Further, for the detailed reasons stated above, the Draft Bill may be considered arbitrary to the extent that:
(a) crypto-assets are being treated differently from other phenomena like
physical cash, commodities (particularly, gold), securities, loyalty
points systems, and the Internet, though each of the concerns in the
Committee Report applies to one or more of these phenomena;
(b) the underlying Committee Report is one-sided and does not proceed
on a rational and scientific basis; and,
(c) certain provisions like the very definition of, and prohibition of dealing in, crypto-assets are vague, leading to a “boundless sea of uncertainty”, a phenomenon frowned upon by the Supreme Court.178
As far as the interest of commerce and innovation is concerned (a factor
which may be relevant in an assessment of a restriction “in the interest of the
general public” under Article 19(6)), as stated above, various software industry voices, including NASSCOM, the leading software industry trade body,
have stated that the Committee Report’s recommendation of an outright ban
is excessive, and that risk-based regulation should be adopted instead.
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to dark pools/cash and to offshore locations, thus raising concerns on AML/CFT and
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The balanced outlook has perhaps been best summarized by Christine
Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, who
wrote,
A judicious look at crypto-assets should lead us to neither crypto-condemnation nor crypto-euphoria. Just as a few technologies
that emerged from the dot-com era have transformed our lives, the
crypto-assets that survive could have a significant impact on how we
save, invest and pay our bills. That is why policymakers should keep
an open mind and work toward an even-handed regulatory framework that minimizes risks while allowing the creative process to bear
fruit.179
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